The Life and Death of Saddam and Osama by Editor, IBPP
International Bulletin of Political 
Psychology 
Volume 14 Issue 15 Article 4 
5-6-2003 
The Life and Death of Saddam and Osama 
Editor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, International Relations Commons, Near and 
Middle Eastern Studies Commons, Other Political Science Commons, Other Psychology Commons, Peace 
and Conflict Studies Commons, Personality and Social Contexts Commons, Social Psychology Commons, 
and the Terrorism Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Editor (2003) "The Life and Death of Saddam and Osama," International Bulletin of Political Psychology: 
Vol. 14 : Iss. 15 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol14/iss15/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
International Bulletin of Political Psychology 
1 
 
Title: The Life and Death of Saddam and Osama 
Author: Editor  
Volume: 14 
Issue: 15 
Date: 2003-05-06 
Keywords: Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein 
 
(A version of this article appears in the May 5, 2003 Issue of the United States publication, Newsday.) 
 
Is Saddam Hussein alive or dead? Should he be wanted dead or alive? For years, such questions were of 
huge import. Now they don’t matter at all. 
 
Why don’t they matter? The Bush administration is faced with a win-win situation regardless of the 
fallen Iraqi leader’s fate—a very different situation than that presented by the fate of Osama bin Laden. 
 
If Saddam Hussein is dead, his fate becomes the déjà vu all over again (sic) of a majority of fallen tyrants 
as big as Nazi Germany’s Hitler or as small as Liberia’s Samuel Doe.  His death can show that tyranny 
does not pay, and that sooner or latter it must be swept away by the natural order of things with some 
help from the defenders of what is right and just. 
 
Regardless of the manner of his death — suicide, a wartime casualty through bunker-busting bombing, 
assassination through poison, shooting or stabbing, or even a natural medical demise — the Iraqi 
government (aka regime) has been changed. The beginnings of a freer, democratic Iraq that can better 
meet the needs of the Iraqi people can finally stir — or so the talking heads of the Bush administration 
can say. 
 
And if he is alive? His power is gone. There is no place to reconstitute a next act, because there is no 
stage that would be willing to accept any further play. 
 
In some ways, Hussein could be said to suffer even more in a relatively powerless state of life than in 
whatever experience might have immediately preceded his demise. This could especially be the case 
when he would contemplate on all he had lost and all that he would feel entitled to — as might be 
expected from someone whom psychiatric experts have termed a malignant narcissist. 
 
Whether Hussein is dead or alive, the Bush administration would be able to broadcast a pet mantra for 
the benefit of all terrorists, terrorist supporters, and the audience of the general global public: “You can 
run, but you can’t hide.” 
 
The same win-win situation applies not only to the Bush administration but also to virtually all political 
actors who may be wondering how Saddam Hussein’s fate affects their own interests.  As with the Bush 
administration, these others — as diverse as terrorist groups, non-governmental humanitarian 
organizations and national governments—can use Hussein’s life and death so that either works in their 
favor. 
 
Terrorist groups can use either version of Saddam Hussein’s fate as a rationale for recruiting, planning, 
and carrying out further acts of terrorism.  Both a live and a dead Saddam can allow humanitarian 
organizations to go about the business of fund-raising, obtaining and transporting resources, and 
physically and even spiritually saving people. Saddam—whether alive or dead—can motivate the 
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realpolitik of one national government, the humanitarian-laden foreign policy of another, and the 
totalitarianism or state-sponsored terrorism of yet another government that is a part of some axis of 
evil.  (It is true, of course, that even as everyone wins, all wins will not be equal.) 
 
However, before we conclude that a win-win situation is the coin of the realm after the demise of 
leaders with blood on their hands, let’s look at the case of Osama bin Laden. 
 
Here the Bush administration is faced with a lose-lose situation. If bin Laden is still alive, he may well be 
able to have contact with and provide guidance to those he controls and to those he inspires. His very 
existence also may serve to rub salt in a festering wound — that of the only remaining superpower from 
which he is still running and hiding and against which he may still be planning and suborning. 
 
And if bin Laden is dead? Unlike the publicized death of Hussein, the publicity attendant to bin Laden’s 
death could well reinforce an image of the terrorist leader as martyr. This could not only energize 
practicing terrorists but help create new ones. So bin Laden as dead or alive matters to the Bush 
administration and presents real problems. However, not much can be done about them. 
 
As even the most cursory readers of history and observers of the human condition may realize, some 
people are worth more dead than alive. Others are worth more alive rather than dead. The same applies 
when people are proven most useful through love, hate, or fear of them. Saddam Hussein is truly in the 
dustbin of history. Live or dead, Osama bin Laden is not. 
 
(See Black, J.  (2002). The murder of memory: Freud, Moses, and the death of Rabin. Mortality, 7, 83-95; 
Gerami, S.  (2003). Mullahs, martyrs, and men: Conceptualizing masculinity in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. Men & Masculinities, 5, 257-274; Los, M.  (2002). Post-communist fear of crime and the 
commercialization of security. Theoretical Criminology, 6, 165-188; Rucker, D. D., & Pratkanis, A. R.  
(2001). Projection as an interpersonal influence tactic: The effects of the pot calling the kettle black. 
Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1494-1507). 
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